Choice and competition policies in public services are popular reform strategies in the member states of the European Union (EU). The European choice agenda is based on the view in the EU of 'social policy as a productive factor' and the need for 'modernisation' of the EU welfare states. This user-led, consumer oriented approach highlights the need to understand the effects of the choice and competition policies in public service. In conventional welfare economic the focus lies on analysis of efficiency, quality and equity effects and the current empirical evidence show varying results. This paper discusses choice policies in European countries and uses the case of choice in health care in the UK is to assess the welfare effects of choice and competition. The UK has a highly developed consumerist policy, and as it has served as a role model for other European countries implementing choice policies. The welfare effects are assessed using satisfaction with the NHS and subjective wellbeing as an indicator of individual welfare, gained from the introduction of choice of hospital in 2006. Further the equity aspect of choice is assessed by analysing variation in welfare effects between socio economic groups. The results indicate positive effects of choice, particularly for middle class individuals.
Assessing Welfare Effects of the European Choice Agenda: The case of health care in the United Kingdom
Introduction
In Europe, policies promoting individual choice in health care, often coupled with marketisation and increased competition in various quasi-market solutions, is seen both as a way to contain costs and increase efficiency and quality in public services (Le Grand 2007) . Choice and competition is by an extensive literature argued to improve efficiency and quality, whereas political rhetoric promotes choice not only as a cost-saving, economically efficient organising principle of public services, but also as something intrinsically valuable in any democratic society. Choice policies have also been a common feature of most Western European countries, increasingly since the 1990's, but has in later years spread to the eastern European member states.
The European Union (EU) broadly promotes choice and competition, which are seen as the essence of the Single Market project and the same ideas have increasingly been applied to the public services agenda. Recently, social policy is discussed as a productive factor and has become subject to a 'modernisation' agenda, as to which competition and user choice are inherent aspects (Huber, Maucher et al. 2008:16) . The 'Modernisation' agenda is argued to be driven by, the changing social and economic reality of the member states of the EU (CEC 2008) . The focus on, and promotion of, choice and competition in public services in the EU predicts a further expansion of this type of public sector reform, which highlights the need for further assessment and understanding choice and competition policies.
Following the broad expansion of choice and competition policies in member states of the EU, this paper examines the relations between individual welfare and increased choice and competition in public services and more particularly in health care provision. This question is particularly relevant as to date, the empirical evidence of improved efficiency and quality from the introduction of choice and competition policies in the health care sector is relatively weak (Propper, Wilson et al. 2006; Le Grand 2007b) . This provides for an interesting starting point for an alternative approach to assessing welfare effects, and corresponds to the critique of the conventional outcome oriented approach of welfare economics, limiting our understanding of welfare effects (Hahn 1982; Ng 1988) . In this paper I argue that the use of subjective measures can add to our understanding of welfare effects of choice policies. In general terms, extending the analysis beyond the economic outcome measures of welfare -commonly analysed through "willingness to pay" revealed preferences-is particularly important when analysing the welfare effects of procedures such as making a choice. In regards to the literature on the effects of choice policies, the main bulk of contributions concern efficiency or quality effects, measured through objective indicators such as length of stay, mortality or morbidity.
The use of subjective indicators allows for the inclusion of both possible welfare effects of choice itself, and effects on service quality (through competition or otherwise). Procedural utility generated from the process of choosing (any benefit from choice that is not due to improved outcomes) which may also be interpreted as the commonly discussed "intrinsic value" of choice.
The welfare effects are assessed using the case of choice and competition policy in health care in the United Kingdom (UK), and more specifically the introduction of choice of hospital in England in 2006. The English case was selected due to the scope of reform; it has developed from a situation offering very little choice, through a gradual expansion of choice and competition elements into a broad quasi-market system, and as it is argued to have served as a role model for other European countries in reforming their health care policy. Cabiedes and Guillen argue that the UK is a country of inspiration for other European countries, partly due to the style of reform, including the production of white papers that outline that the broad intentions of policies (2001: 1215) . As discussed below, the UK exemplifies a trend in health system development common among Beveridgean type health care systems, including the Scandinavian countries and Spain, where user choice has continuously been extended since the early 1990s. Finally, the case of hospital choice in England benefits from the availability of detailed and reliable data which provides an opportunity for exploring of the effects of choice on individual welfare.
The potential effect of choice on equity is also explored, which is particularly relevant for the UK case as equity effects of choice policies have been a very much debated. I attempt to trace whether any welfare effects of choice is dependent on the socio-economic group membership. This examination is intended to provide indications in relation to the debate in the UK, both among academic commentators and politicians, who present opposing views on the question of who benefits from choice policies (Dixon, Grand et al. 2003 ; Dixon and Grand 2006; Barr, Fenton et al. 2008) . Some argue that choice is socially exclusive and that its benefits are mostly felt by the middle-classes. Lower socio-economic groups, characterised by lower income and level of education, are said to benefit less from increased choice (Dixon and Grand 2006) . Others argue that previous to the choice policies, only the relatively wealthy had choice (of private insurance), and hence with the general choice policy, all individuals now benefit from choice (Le Grand 2007b).
The paper continues with a brief literature review, followed by a discussion about choice reform in European countries and the relevance of the UK as a case study. The UK policy used for the empirical analysis, choice at referral in the English NHS, is then outlined. The empirical analysis is divided into two parts, a first part examining the relationship between choice and individual's satisfaction with the NHS followed by a second part analysing the effects of higher competitions on individual subjective wellbeing (SWB). Section five concludes with a discussion of the results and implications for further research.
Understanding Welfare Effects of Choice
This brief literature review further elaborates the relevance of choice polices in public services in the EU, with particular focus on health policies. The meaning of choice policies and the implications for the functioning of societies and the view on the state and the citizen are discussed. The literature on SWB and how it adds to the conventional approach to evaluating welfare policy is followed by brief empirical evidence on efficiency and quality in health care. Finally, the aspect of equity in access has been heavily debated both in the literature, among politicians and policy makers, with strong arguments both in favour of choice being equitable and of choice being socially exclusive.
Political economy of choice policies
Choice policies are much debated in from a political economy point of view as they have clear implications for the relationship between individual state and the market.
Oliver and Evans highlights how the promotion of choice align with the individualist view of the society rather than a more communitarist approach (Oliver and Evans 2005) . Here the debate questions the individual's responsibility for his or her choice and the outcomes they produce, and what level of independence from the authorities is desirable. The citizen becomes a consumer of public services and even if the political science literature views choice as a basic democratic right, choice in public services raises the question of how to secure accountability and quality control in a quasi-market setting (Newman and Kuhlmann 2007) . Burström even argues that the choice discourse can be seen as a move away from political accountability to a society of consumerist action (2009). The individualisation through choice policies in public services are further argued to affect the concept of citizenship as well as dynamics of welfare governance (Newman, Glendinning et al. 2008) . Newman et al's point has implications for the welfare governance also on the European level, where the "choice agenda" concerns issues such as effects of cross-border mobility on health care, long-term care and education. Choice policies are changing the way the welfare state is understood, on a national level, as well as on a European level.
Understanding and Measuring Welfare
Theoretically, the economic concepts of welfare and utility have continuously been the subject of debate and critique. The standard approach is to measure welfare effects in welfare economics is through one of the many versions of cost-benefit analysis, using revealed preferences or statements of willingness-to-pay to establish how the benefits can be valued. There are two issues with this approach; firstly, it is argued that the "willingness-to-pay" estimates are unreliable for public goods such as health care services (Costa-Font and Rovira 2005) . Secondly, the understanding of human behaviour in standard economics is argued to be limited by the assumptions of rational preferences theory. In behavioural economics it is argued that utility and human behaviour should be approached in a setting of bounded rationality, due to imperfect information and cognitive limitations (Thaler 1991) and the possibility that individuals are "satisficing" rather than "optimising" when making choices (Schwartz, Ward et al. 2002) . Further, Margolis questions the idea of individuals being governed by self-interest, arguing that there are other values determining behaviour, which should be incorporated into economic models (2007) . 1 The critique of welfare economics can be met by using subjective measures of welfare, and this has been the subject of a blossoming research field referred to as the happiness literature. 2 One of the core arguments is that subjective measures of wellbeing capture individual utility more accurately than the revealed preference approach, and that SWB capture the actual motivation for individual behaviour (Frijters 2000) Further, Frey, Stutzer and Benz argue that the procedure carries 1 In understanding welfare effects of choice, a vital part is how the choice situation is perceived, how many choices were presented, and how well the options fulfilled the patient's needs. This requires experimental research or data on perceptions of the procedures of presenting choice. This is not available within the scope of this paper. Indicative secondary data is discussed in below. See Dixon (2007) . 2 For a recent review see Dolan el al. (2008) important implications for individual welfare and should be incorporated into the utility concept (Frey and Stutzer 2000; Benz 2005) . As this paper exemplifies, this is particularly relevant when assessing institutionalised processes of welfare services such as here; choice policies. The framework of procedural utility was initially created by Frey and Stutzer with the purpose to offer a new understanding for economic and political questions (2000) .
Choice and Welfare Effects
The practical introduction of choice is generally promoted as an efficiency enhancing policy, cutting costs as well as creating incentives for improved quality and providing equal access for all. The aspects of efficiency, quality and equity are basic building blocks of conventional welfare economic evaluation of welfare effects of a policy (Barr 2001) . The evidence of the effects of choice policies in public services provide varying results, with choice policy deemed to be efficiency and quality enhancing under certain conditions such as the correctly incentivising payments structures (Le Grand 2007) . But regardless of the actual efficiency and quality effects, choice is promoted across the disciplines based on the idea that it is an intrinsic good-that more choice is positive in its own right (Dowding and John 2009) .
Efficiency effects of choice policies are not likely to directly affect individual welfare.
However, following the argument of Krutilla the overall efficiency of the system may generate indirect effects on welfare, through the existence value of a well-functioning health care system (1967) . Individuals perceiving that the health system is costefficient, i.e. makes the most of the taxpayers money, can possibly draw welfare from this conviction. Apart from the indirect effects on welfare, efficiency arguments are not the most important for the analysis of individual welfare.
Quality improvements instigated by choice policies are argued to be brought about as the policy give opportunity to "exit" rather than using "voice" as would be the status quo solution (Hirschman 1970) . The traditional idea, that patients would influence service through complaints, either to the health care provider or responsible officials idea, that is, relying on patient 'voice' alone may not be enough to raise quality.
"Voice" in itself could also be a source of inequity as discussed below. Instead, patients should be given the ability to 'exit' in order to put pressure on providers to raise their performance. However, the nature of the health care market may lead to delay of improvements and the "exit" may not be noticed instantly. Propper et al. found small yet positive effects of choice on quality, measured as death rates after treatment following heart attacks (2004). Similar results were found by Cooper, Gibbons et al using AMI mortality as a quality indicator, finding that mortality fell more quickly (i.e. quality improved) for patients living in more competitive markets after the introduction of hospital competition in the UK, in January 2006. The results suggest that hospital competition in markets with fixed prices can lead to improvements in clinical quality (2010). In the US, which has a, compared to Europe, very privatised and choice oriented health care sector, it has been found that markets that are more competitive also bring more quality (Propper, Wilson et al. 2006) .
Equity of Choice
Regardless of the possible negative effects on equity choice has, in the UK, been promoted extensively as an equity enhancing policy. This is highlighted in the following speech by John Reid, Health Secretary of the Labour government. These choices will be there for everybody…not just for a few who know their way around the system. Not just for those who know someone 'in the loop' -but for everybody with every referral. That's why our approach to increasing choice and increasing equity go hand in hand. We can only improve equity by equalising as far as possible the information and capacity to choose (Reid 2003) .
The idea put forward by the UK government was that in the system where the "money follows the patient", patients are enabled to exit and switch providers, and, as a result, incentives for providers to treat all patients well, irrespective of a patient's ability to negotiate with their provider, voice their displeasure with their care, or somehow manage to game the health care system, are created (Department of Health 2003) . Further, the UK government and academics associated with the government argued that even in systems without formalized choice mechanisms, choice still existed for middle and upper classes that have the ability to negotiate with their providers for better care or pay to enter the private sector. Creating formalized choice mechanisms, they argued, would give every patient the ability to choose irrespective of their socioeconomic status (Cooper and Le Grand 2008) .
The effects of choice and quasi-market structures in welfare services on different segments of the population has been debated in the literature, questioning whether choice policies are as equitable as the politicians often argue. The emphasis on the potential of choice to improve care for the traditionally underserved ran contrary to the traditional notion that giving patients choice could harm equity (Cooper and LeGrand 2008) . The government and academics associated with the government argued that even in systems without formalized choice mechanisms, choice still existed for middle and upper classes that have the ability to negotiate with their providers for better care or pay to enter the private sector. By extending choice to the whole population these gaps in opportunities for choice of care were intended to be closed.
There may however remain barriers for certain groups of the population, threatening equity of access to care; 'voice' problems such as communication difficulties, language, literacy, assertiveness, articulation, self-confidence and ability to deal with professionals, cultural and health beliefs and behaviour, transport difficulties and travel distance, as well as the time and financial costs of travel, family or work commitments (Dixon, Grand et al. 2003 ; . The outcome may be that poorer individuals have longer waiting times because their travel and information costs are relatively higher. Dixon et al conclude that there are remaining barriers to access, connected with differences between social groups in respect of strength of 'voice' and in their health beliefs and health seeking behaviour (Dixon, Grand et al. 2003 In practice, choice policies are widespread in European health care systems, albeit with clearly disperse reform trajectory depending on underlying model of health system. As table 1 illuminates, the health care systems in European countries tend to follow two main archetypal trajectories of development with considerably different approaches to choice. The Beveridge model is found in the United Kingdom, the Scandinavian countries and in Spain, which however was relatively late in introducing choice reforms. The health care systems in these countries are denoted by a single payer, financed by national taxation, and the use of a National Health Service of generally publicly owned hospitals. Access to hospital specialists is typically by referral via a general practitioner (GP), and overall limited choice has been offered to patients, while relying on GP's as gatekeepers, guides and coordinators of health care. The emphasis however recently been on increasing choice of hospital for elective care (Bevan and Van De Ven 2010) . Even though Sweden introduced choice policies early in the 1990s, the policies have been was later reversed when a social-democratic government came to power (Blomqvist 2004 ). On the other hand, in the Bismarck model countries, exemplified by Germany, France and the Netherlands, the reform trajectory is moving in the opposite direction, with traditionally free choice being constricted for cost-containment issues. The model is denoted by multiple-insurer financing, employer-based schemes supplemented by the state, a mixed public and private provision in which and patients have direct access to specialists. Controlling total expenditure has partly been done by reducing choice of specialists by types of 'soft' gate keeping (Or, Cases et al. 2010) . Further, the Bismarckian countries have newly introduced choice and competition also in financing of health care to alleviate the expenditure problems. by their GP when being referred for elective surgery. Noteworthy is that 39% state that they were aware of the choice before seeing the GP. Hence the introduction of the choice policy is clearly challenged by an information deficiency which clearly will affect the results in this first part of the analysis. Noteworthy is that the analysis here is driven by perceptions and not necessarily by facts. Unfortunately it is in the current data not possible to identify who was offered a choice and who was not. The regression analysis has the goal of assess the welfare effects of having choice of various aspects to the interaction with the NHS. First I discuss the dependent variables before outlining the model and discussing the results.
Dependent variable
The dependent variable is satisfaction with the NHS, the question being posed "How 
Where satisfaction with the NHS is regressed on a set of demographic covariates i X , and various combinations of choice indicators i C . The coefficients of an ordered probit model cannot be directly interpreted; only the sign and significance is relevant in the tables below. 7 In table 3, the results of the ordered probit are reported on a sample of all English individuals, regardless of whether they have been in the hospital and in effect been subject to the policy. This group may still benefit from the policy through what Krutilla discusses as an existence value. It implies that the welfare effect should be stronger for individuals who have been directly subject to the policy but it is also likely that the policy indirectly affects other individuals, regardless of whether they have been subject to the choice policy, through the experiences of family and friends
The results show an interesting relation between individual's desired level of choice, and how much choice they feel that they get in the NHS. A higher level of desired choice corresponds to a lower level of satisfaction with the NHS. Further, a higher level of perceived choice is associated with a higher level of satisfaction with the NHS. The signs are robust to changes in the specification; the table shows one example where only the "desired level of choice" variable is entered in specification I.
The same relationship applies to the level of choice of treatment desired, and the corresponding perceived amount of choice available. When both sets of variables are entered jointly, only the desired level of choice of hospital is no longer significant, and all signs remain the same.
7 In order to generate relevant coefficients, marginal effects of each category of the dependent variable must be calculated. For the illustrative purposes of this paper the sign and significance provides sufficient information. Marginal effects tables are available from the author. Overall the models have a low explanatory power, which is to be expected from this type of regression on a subjective variable. As discussed below, individual unobservables determine a large part of the variance in this kind of satisfaction measures. What this examination of the data on choice preferences in relation to the NHS indicates is that choice seems to matter for individual satisfaction, and that people increasingly welcome choice in health care.
Competition and Welfare
This section investigates whether a higher number of hospitals within the local authority, indicating both that the individual has a larger "feasible" choice set, and Firstly, table 5 shows a set of regression specifications of common demographic and socio-economic covariates of life satisfaction, by now well-known from the happiness literature, and how these interact with the competition measure. The competition index is consistently positive and significant, but becomes insignificant (just above the 10% level) when income is subtracted from the regression. We know from the literature that income is a strong determinant of life satisfaction, and in this incompletely specified regression the effect of income slightly outweighs the effect of the competition index. This problem disappears when introducing further controls in the specifications below.
9 Meaning that the difference between 2 and 3 is the same as between 6 and 7 and hence it is possible to say that an individual with a score of 4 is twice as satisfied as an individual with 2. 10 Regression tables of all regression varieties are available upon request from the author. (table with full coefficients is available in appendix). A higher self-rated health status is strongly positive and significant whereas being disabled is strongly negative, and again significant. The importance of health variables for the individual life satisfaction highlights the likelihood that differences in health care would influence SWB (the measure of welfare).
The overall explanatory power of the models, the r-square, ranges between 0.05 and 0.20 which is coherent with what is to be expected from SWB models. Full models with observable covariates of SWB explain between 8 and 20% of the variation, the rest is explained by unobservable variables such as personality traits and individual conditions influencing the SWB rating. More choice and competition seem to be positive overall, however, on this follows the question of whether the results are consistent for all social groups as has been strongly argued as discussed above. In brief, the debate concerns issues such as the fact that prior to the introduction of the broad choice in health care policies of the 2000s, income was a strong determinant of the availability of choice, with only the relatively wealthy in a position to choose private care. The introduction of broad choice policies has therefore been described as equitable since they extend choice to all income groups. This may imply that lower income groups should gain relatively more well-being from the option to choose than higher income groups who already had a degree of choice. Level of education, meanwhile, is argued to play an important role in the propensity to use and appreciate choice in health care as individuals with higher education are more likely to be IT literate, better able to grasp the presented choice set, more capable of making informed choices and more confident in their discussions with doctors (Dixon, Grand et al. 2003 ) . Hence it is likely that individuals with a higher level of education will enjoy relatively more well-being from being offered a choice of hospital.
Here the welfare effects of choice on various social groups are based on a selection of groups identified with the purpose of assessing the equity effects of choice. There are several imputed social group variables available in the BHPS such as Goldthorpe's class schema, but the pre-calibrated variables imputed from other questions in the BHPS have the problematic drawback of reducing the sample size beyond feasibility for the regressions. This is also the reason for using only individual indicators such as income and education, rather than creating composite indicators of social groups. I use individual indicators to replicated the following groups: firstly, the "middle class" group that has been argued to be the target group of choice policies though "middle class electoral politics, identified through "above median income", "high education" and "skilled worker". According to this literature, the middle class group benefits most from choice policies and in health care this is argued to be a result of superior capabilities to make optimal use of the choice offered. The "working class"
group is argued to be less able to make use and benefit from the policy, due to lower level of education and funds to travel to other hospitals than the local, here analysed as "below median income", "low education" and "unskilled workers".
The results are reported in table 7, and in order to avoid collinearity the demographic control variables, income and health controls have been removed. These are strongly correlated with social group, for example poor health is highly overrepresented in lower social groups (the regression have also been run with the controls included, an example can be found in table 8 ). The effect of competition is only positive and significant for individuals with above median income and high education whereas the sub-samples of below median income earners, low education, skilled and lowskilled workers are all insignificant. 11 As discussed above, choice is often argued to be a "middle class policy" primarily benefiting the more affluent and of higher education, and the results in table 7 is consistent with this argument. Individuals with higher than median income, and individuals with high education (defined as further education beyond a-levels, see appendix for data and variable specification) are the only groups that are significantly benefited by higher competition, and hence more choice in their local authority. Table 8 illustrates the robustness of the results for these groups when adding demographic covariates, health variables and household income.
11 Some of the specifications have negative r-square which is explained by overall misspecification. They are only included for illustrative purposes, and the results are consistent when, if possible due to sample size, extending the specification with further controls. 12 Further indicators that represent an insufficient sample size in the BHPS data was private health insurance The effect for individuals with above median income, 0.76 (full specification), and for highly educated individuals, 0.87, is considerably higher than the coefficient of 0.57 for the whole sample. This implies that the two sub-groups gain 20-30% more than the average individual and the results are consistent with the argument that choice policies are not primarily equitable as they benefit the already well off more. This may be due to higher level of education, and more capability to make use of the choice in a way that generates welfare. This speaks in favour of the argument in the literature that an important aspect of choice policies is to understand the capability on the part of the individual to actually make the choice.
Conclusions
The analysis above has provided insights into the welfare effects Further, the effect of competition on life satisfaction is positive overall, which indicates the more choice and competition improves welfare. However, this effect
only holds for what is here defined as "middle class" individuals with a good income and high education. Hence, the argument that the "new" choice policies in health care are equitable is not supported by the present analysis. Rather, the results point towards the often made argument that choice is a middle class policy, mainly benefiting well educated, high income individuals who are able to make optimal use of the available choice.
The overall positive effects of choice indicated by the results of the empirical analysis has implications for the choice agenda of the EU, which has received critique for 
Hospital competition index
Within this market area, to measure the degree of market concentration, the negative natural logarithm of an HHI (Hirschman-Herfindahl index of market concentration) based on hospitals' patient shares. This negative log transformation of the HHI is convenient because it increases with competition, with zero corresponding to monopoly and infinity to perfect competition. For given market area j, the competition index is given by:
Here, nk is the number of procedures carried out at hospital site k within market area j and Nj is the total number of procedures carried out in market area j.
Matching of hospital competition index and BHPS by local authority
The hospital competition index is a number between 0 and 1 for each hospital. As lowest geographical aggregation in the BHPS is local authority code, the competition index had to be aggregated by local authority area. In … of the cases there was more than one hospital per local authority and in those cases the average value of the individual competition index for each hospital was calculated. In most of the cases with more than one hospital the competition index was very close between the present hospitals, but in a small number of cases the difference was considerable. In these cases an individual judgement was made of the size of the local authority and the localisation of the hospitals to assess the appropriate competition level for the local authority. The index for each local authority was then merged onto the BHPS so that each individual was assigned a value for the local authority of residence.
